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Executive Summary 
During the Celtic Tiger boom Ireland experienced a phenomenal growth in property 
construction and house prices.  Construction became a major component and driver of 
the Irish economy.  Both development and its underlying finances were allowed to 
become massively over-extended, creating an enormous property bubble.  Rather than 
the much hoped for ‘soft landing’, the bubble popped in spectacular fashion leading to 
a radical transformation of the property market, with tumbling house prices and 
widespread negative equity, and a collapse in construction activity. 
 
Government has two principle levers through which it can seek to regulate property 
development.  The first is through fiscal policy with respect to regulating access to 
credit and determining taxation rates.  The second is through planning policy and the 
zoning of land and the granting of planning permissions.  Explanations of the Irish 
property bubble have focused almost exclusively on the former, and the role of the 
banks, tax incentive schemes, and the failures of financial regulators.  To date, the 
role of the planning system in creating the property bubble has been little 
considered.  And yet, the banks could have lent all the money they desired, but if 
zonings and planning permissions were not forthcoming then development could not 
have occurred in the way that it did.   
 
As well as a catastrophic failure in Ireland’s banking and financial regulatory system, 
there has been a catastrophic failure of the planning system.  In a housing boom 
planning should act as a counter-balance to the pressures of development in order to 
maintain a stable housing market and try to prevent boom and bust cycles.  Planning 
should provide checks and balances to the excesses of development and act for the 
common good, even if that means taking unpopular decisions.  However, during the 
Celtic Tiger period a laissez-faire approach to planning predominated at all levels of 
governance that was insufficiently evidence-informed with respect to long-term 
demographic demand, market conditions and issues of sustainability, and which 
marginalised and ignored more cautious voices.  Both the fiscal and planning levers of 
development were overly pro-growth.  As a result, not only was there an 
unsustainable growth in property prices, but this was accompanied by a property 
building frenzy that led to a significant oversupply of housing (as well as offices, 
retail units and hotels) in almost all parts of the country.  The level of over-
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development that has occurred will take years to correct and seriously hamper the 
recovery of the housing market and the operation of NAMA.  Indeed, there are 
legitimate questions as to whether NAMA can succeed in its aims over its intended 
life-span. 
 
It is our contention that an independent review of the operation of the planning 
system during the Celtic Tiger years be undertaken to consider fully the role of 
planning in the creation of the property bubble, similar to the Honohan (2010) and 
the Regling and Watson (2010) reports on banking and financial regulation.  The 
review would examine planning policy formation and application, and the 
organisation, operation and regulation of planning within and across different 
agencies and at all scales in Ireland.  It would investigate all aspects of the planning 
system and its operation, including charges of localism, cronyism and clientelism 
where appropriate.  The inquiry should not take the form of a witch hunt or a blame 
game, but rather constitute a systemic review of how the planning system failed to 
counter and control the excesses of the boom and provide a more stable and 
sustainable pattern of development. 
 
In this working paper, we examine the creation of ‘a haunted landscape’ – the recent 
boom and the bust of the Irish housing market, and the creation of a new 
phenomenon, ‘ghost estates’.  We draw on and analyze numerous different 
government and industry datasets to provide a rigorous evidence base for our 
conclusions.  What the data reveal is a pattern of development that ran counter to 
what one would have expected or hoped for - those local authorities that had the 
most vacant stock in 2006, subsequently built the most new housing, now have 
the highest surpluses of stock, and have the most land zoned for future use.  
Essentially, a number of local authorities did not heed good planning guidelines and 
regional and national objectives; conduct sensible demographic profiling of potential 
demand; or take account of the fact that much of the land zoned lacks essential 
services such as water and sewerage treatment plants, energy supply, public transport 
or roads.  Instead, permissions and zoning have been facilitated by the abandonment 
of basic planning principles by elected representatives on the local and national stage 
and driven by the demands of local people, developers and speculators, and ambitious, 
localised growth plans framed within a zero-sum game of potentially being left behind 
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with respect to development.  Further, central government not only failed to 
adequately oversee, regulate and direct local planning, but actively encouraged its 
excesses through tax incentive schemes and the flaunting of its own principles as set 
out in the National Spatial Strategy through policies such as decentralisation. 
 
Rather than simply describe what has occurred with respect to housing development 
over the past twenty years, we seek to provide a detailed explanation of why the 
bubble was created and the effects of it bursting.  We also provide a critique of the 
government’s response to the crisis, and in particular the creation of NAMA.  We 
suggest that seven key issues will need to be addressed before consumers regain 
confidence, property prices bottom out, and the housing market starts to function 
properly.  First, supply and demand will need to be harmonized.  Second, there has to 
be a sustained growth in the economy with an associated fall in unemployment.  
Third, house prices have to align more closely to average industrial earnings.  Fourth, 
affordable credit has to be available for first time buyers and those trading up.  Fifth, 
the uncertainties concerning NAMA and its operation have to dispelled, especially 
since it will be controlling a sizable share of property and land.  This necessitates full 
transparency of the agency’s workings and the assets it is managing.  Sixth, 
consumers have to be satisfied that the banking crisis is truly over and that financial 
institutions are properly regulated.  Seventh, substantive changes need to occur in the 
planning system to ensure that it works for the common good and produces 
sustainable development.   
 
Our analysis suggests that there is little need for housing development in the 
state in the immediate future beyond selected social housing provision.  This is 
not to say that this is no requirement for construction, however.  Where 
construction could be fruitfully undertaken is with respect to public facilities such as 
schools and hospitals, public transport, roads, energy and broadband infrastructure.  
Such a targeted capital investment could, on the one hand, stimulate the economy in 
terms of employment and investment and provide multiplier effects across the private 
sector and, on the other, provide worldclass infrastructure to facilitate and encourage 
indigenous growth and inward investment.  Any such investment should align with 
the National Spatial Strategy and National Development Plan and be delivered 
through a rigorous, responsible and sustainable planning system.
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1. Introduction 
A new spectre is haunting Ireland – the spectre of development run amok.  This 
haunting has left its mark across the entire nation in the form of one-off houses, new 
housing estates, shopping centres, business parks and hotel developments, many of 
which now lie idle, deserted, and unfinished.  Whilst notionally guided by principals 
such as creating sustainable communities and balanced development, the building 
frenzy was, in reality, driven by the ambitions and actions of developers and 
speculators, supported by banks hungry for quick profits, pro-growth local authorities 
afraid to be left behind, and a government greedy for the indirect, cyclic taxes the 
construction sector generated.  The planning and tax systems, rather than providing 
checks and balances to guide and limit development, were used to facilitate the 
property boom by, on the one hand, providing land rezoning and planning 
permissions, and on the other incentivizing construction projects.  The result was an 
enormous, inflated property bubble that was producing units in excess of any kind of 
realistic projections of demand and was hugely distorting the domestic economy in 
terms of contributions to GNP/GDP, tax receipts and types of employment. 
 
The property boom was an integral component of the Celtic Tiger era in Ireland that 
ran from 1993 to 2007.  The Celtic Tiger years saw a dramatic transformation in 
social and economic life of a country that had to until the start of the 1990s been a 
relatively poor, peripheral nation on the edge of Europe with a weak indigenous 
economy and a foreign direct investment sector characterised by low-skilled, branch 
plant manufacturing.  In the 1990s, Ireland embraced free-market and neoliberal 
principles and aggressively courted foreign direct investment, with the result that 
there was a rapid shift to high-skilled manufacturing, a phenomenal growth in the 
service sector, and the development of a domestic consumer society.  This 
transformation, and its causes, has been reasonably well documented in the academic 
literature (e.g., Allen 2007; Corcoran and Pellion 2002; O’Hearn 1998; O’Riain 2004; 
Bartley and Kitchin 2007; Jacobson et al. 2006; Moore and Scott 2005).    
 
During, and even after, the boom, the ‘Irish model’ has been used as an example of 
the supposed benefits of neoliberal economic reform for countries wishing to fast-
track modernisation.  The model ostensibly takes elements of American neoliberalism 
(minimal state, privatisation of public services, public-private partnerships, 
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developer/speculator led planning, low corporate and individual taxation, light to no 
regulation, clientelism) and blends them with aspects of European social welfarism 
(developmental state, social partnership, welfare safety net, high indirect tax, EU 
directives and obligations).  Despite the seeming simplicity of the Irish model, the 
reality underpinning it is more complex and fragmented, imbued with inherent 
contradictions and paradoxes.  Indeed, as Kitchin and Bartley (2007) document, even 
during the boom years there was a dark side to the Celtic Tiger, and despite the 
rhetoric that all boats rose on its tide, its effects were socially and spatially uneven 
and unequal, so that whilst some boats rose, others took on water, and some capsized 
and sank.   
 
Rather than being the result of some well planned economic master plan, the Celtic 
Tiger was the outcome of a complex set of unfolding, interconnected, often 
serendipitous processes, held together by a strategy of seeking to attract and service 
foreign direct investment.  The model is perhaps better described as a series of 
disparate policies, deals, and actions that were rationalised after-the-fact, rather than 
constituting a coherent plan per-se.  As such, the fact that the Irish model sits 
politically somewhere between ‘Boston and Berlin’ (to use the analogy popularised by 
former Tanaiste Mary Harney in 2000) is not so much the indication of a country 
pioneering a new model of neoliberalism, as it is suggestive of the ways in which new 
policies and programmes were folded into the entrenched apparatus of a short-termist 
political culture shadowed by low-level clientelism and cronyism that works to the 
detriment of long-term, state-wide planning (O’Toole 2009).  The outcome was a 
largely uncoordinated and ‘always emergent’ (McGuirk, 2005) patchwork system of 
neoliberal governance that was, by the middle of the first decade of the new 
millennium, stretched to a ruinous breaking point.  The global financial crisis of 2008 
brought these inherently tenuous arrangements to an inevitable and dramatic head, 
exposing the deep flaws in an Irish economic model that was predicated on constant 
growth to function and had few checks and balances (rather than simply being the 
result of stupidity and corruption as Fintan O’Toole, 2009, would have it – though 
they undoubtedly played their part). 
 
Due to the vulnerabilities of this economic model, and the openness of the Irish 
economy, and the fact that from 2002 GDP growth was being driven not by exports 
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but by the property sector, the crisis has been felt more strongly and deeply in Ireland 
than in many developed countries.  In particular, the dependence on the property 
market as a key driver of the economy and a vital source of tax revenue has left the 
country with a set of serious problems that may take a generation or more to resolve.  
As the global crisis deepened, the Irish property bubble burst, and the vast over-
exposure of Irish banks to toxic property loans became apparent.  The collapse of the 
property and banking sectors has led to: a contraction in the wider economy, with the 
drying up of credit, markets and tax receipts, leading to a huge hole in the public 
purse; an extensive bank bailout, including the establishment of the National Assets 
Management Agency (NAMA) that has acquired €88b of property debt and rolled up 
interest from Irish banks; bank recapitalisation (Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Bank) 
and nationalisation (Irish Nationwide Building Society, Anglo Irish Bank, EBS); 
massive state borrowing to service the bank bailout and the public sector spend; rising 
unemployment; and plummeting house prices.   
 
By the end of 2009, the Government’s tax take had shrunk to €33 billion, yet net 
expenditure for the year was €47 billion, with the hole in the public finances standing 
at a €24.6 billion and rising at over a billion a month (Irish Times, 5th January 2010).  
Figure 1 illustrates this taxation crisis by detailing government expenditure vis-à-vis 
GNP.  As of May 2010, bank recapitalisation had cost €21.8bn with a projection for a 
further €10b (Carswell et al 2010), and NAMA was projected to pay €47bn for its 
property portfolio (Finfacts 2010).  The Central Bank predicts that the State will have 
to write-off €25bn in unrecoverable capital injections into Anglo-Irish Bank and Irish 
Nationwide Building Society (Honohan 2010).  The numbers of people signing onto 
the Live Register has risen from 160,139 in January 2006, with a seasonally adjusted 
standardised unemployment rate of 4.4%, to 439,100 by May 2010, with an 
seasonally adjusted standardised unemployment rate of 13.7% (see CSO 2010a; 
datasheet 1).  House prices have depreciated substantially to the extent that 250,000 
households are in negative equity and, as of the end of Q1 2010, 32,321 mortgages are 
in arrears for 90 days or more (4.1 per cent of residential mortgages) (Mortgage 
Arrears and Personal Debt Expert Group 2010). 
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Figure 1: Current government expenditure and revenue, 1960-2010 
 
 
Source: Honohan (2010: 30) 
 
For the past twenty years, Ireland has grappled with rapid transformation socially, 
economically and intellectually, and the country is yet again experiencing another 
seismic shift.  In this paper, we document the crisis in Ireland through a lens that 
focuses on the Irish housing market and so-called ghost estates – speculative, under-
occupied, often unfinished housing developments that now litter the Irish landscape.  
In so doing, we highlight how the Irish housing boom and collapse was inextricably 
shaped by the institutionally and place specific nature of Irish neoliberalism.   
 
The paper has seven parts.  First, we detail how the Irish economy and property sector 
was transformed in the Celtic Tiger period.  Second, we document the extent of the 
present housing crisis in Ireland.  Third, we examine levels of vacancy and oversupply 
throughout the country.  Fourth, we explore the new phenomena of ghost estates.  
Fifth, we explain the Irish housing bubble, providing an analysis of political, 
economic and planning systems and policies that operated during the Celtic Tiger era.  
Sixth, we examine the government’s response to the crisis, focusing in particular on 
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the work of NAMA.  Lastly, we draw some conclusions and make suggestions as to 
what needs to occur for the crisis to be resolved. 
 
2. From Crisis to Boom: Housing during the Celtic Tiger 
During the 1980s Ireland experienced a severe recession accompanied by crippling 
interest rates (between 1980 and 1983 interest rates were above 15 percent, and at 
times over 20 percent; Kelly 2003), a weak currency, high unemployment (between 
1979 and 1985 unemployment rose from 7.8 percent to 18.2 percent; Ferriter 2004), 
high rates of emigration (net out-migration was on average 35,000 per year between 
1986-89; total population in 1986, 3,540,643), and a generally weak economy (in 
1987, Irish GDP was 63 percent of the EU average; Breathnach 1998).  Ireland was a 
small country on the periphery of Europe with a weak economy that appeared to have 
relatively poor future prospects beyond small-to-medium size indigenous companies, 
foreign direct investment in low-skill manufacturing, and EU subsidies (Kitchin and 
Bartley 2007).   
 
From the early 1990s, however, all this started to change markedly, with the country 
entering a period economic expansion where its GDP growth per annum was double 
or more that of its European neighbours, and its wealth levels, in terms of average 
income, rose to amongst the highest of any developed nation (in 2003 the OECD 
estimated that in terms of GDP per capita, based on Purchasing Power Parities, 
Ireland was ranked 4th in the world; ESRI 2005).  This was accompanied by low 
interest rates, a large expansion of the workforce (between 1992 and June 2007 the 
number of workers increased by 973,700 from 1.165m to 2.139m; CSO 2010b, 
datasheet 2), a consistently low unemployment rate, and a sustained growth in 
population, fuelled by return migration, immigrants seeking work, and natural 
increase, that saw the population increase by 16.8% between 1996 and 2006.   
 
After the initial wave of economic expansion from 1993-2002, the state sustained 
economic growth through the illusory apparatus of an inflated property market.  The 
DEHLG (2009) report that in the ten years between January 1996 and December 2005 
an unparalleled, 553,267 housing units were built, with a total stock of 1.733m units 
in 2005 (datasheet 3).  By 2007, Ireland, along with Spain, was producing more than 
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twice as many units per head of population than elsewhere in Europe (see Figure 2; 
datasheet 3). 
 
Figure 2: Housing completions per 1,000 of population 2007 
 
Source: DKM/Euroconstruct 
 
This building frenzy was accompanied by phenomenal growth in house prices.   
The average new house price rose from €78,715 in Dublin, and €66,914 for the 
country as a whole in 1991, to €416,225 in Dublin (a 429% increase) and €322,634 
for the country as a whole (382% increase) in 2007.  Not unsurprisingly, second-hand 
homes follow the same trend, costing on average €76,075 in Dublin in 1991, and 
€64,122 for the country as a whole, rising to €495,576 in Dublin (551% increase) and 
€377,850 (489% increase) across the country in 2007 (see Figure 3; datasheet 4).  In 
the same period, house building costs and wages only doubled (Brawn 2009).  In Q3 
1995 the average secondhand house price was 4.1 times the average industrial wage 
of €18,152, by Q2 2007 secondhand house prices had risen to 11.9 times the average 
industrial wage of €32,616 (datasheet 5). 
 
Similarly, the cost of land spiralled, dramatically increasing in price in 2005 and 
2006, with land jumping in value from just under €10,000 per hectare in 1998 to over 
€58,400 per hectare in 2006 (see Figure 4; Savills HOK 2007).  This made Irish land 
the most expensive in Europe, nearly twice the cost per hectare of any other European 
country and three times greater for all but four countries (Spain, N. Ireland,  
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Figure 3: House prices in Ireland, 1991-2009 
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
Year
H
o
u
se
 p
ri
ce
s 
(€
)
New Homes  ‐
Dublin
New Homes  ‐
Whole Country
Secondhand
homes  ‐ Dublin
Secondhand
homes  ‐ Whole
Country
 
Source: DEHLG 
 
Luxembourg, Netherlands), despite having a largely unrestricted planning system (see 
Figure 5; Savills HOK 2007).  Land price inflation was driven by at least three 
processes (S. Kelly 2009).  First, developers competed for brownfield and other 
prime, urban locations.  In some cases, such sites sold for incredible figures.  For 
example, as Sinead Kelly (2009) notes, in 2005 the 7 acre site of Jury’s Hotel and the 
former Berkeley Court Hotel in central Dublin sold for €379m (€54.1m per acre).  A 
nearby 2.05 acre site, the former UCD Veterinary College, sold for €171.5m (€83.7m 
per acre) and a 0.3 acre site for almost €40m (€95m per acre).  None of the three sites 
had planning permission for re-development.  Derek Brawn (2009) details that 
between 2004 and 2007 there were 55 sites in Dublin 2 and 4, totalling 62 acres, 
which sold for a collective value of €2.01bn.  Second, developers competed for 
agricultural land on the edge of urban areas, with some farmers then re-investing in 
farms elsewhere for inflated prices.  Third, individuals buying small plots of land 
(typically 0.5-2 acres) on the urban edges and in rural locations for one off houses; it 
was not uncommon for such sites to change hands for multiples of €100,000.  The 
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result was that land became a significant component of housing cost, up to 50 percent 
as against a European average of 10-15% (O’Toole 2009).   
 
Correspondingly, the total value of mortgage debt increased from €47.2 billion in 
2002 to over €139.8 billion at the end of 2007, with the average size of a new 
mortgage €266,000, nearly double the 2002 figure (CSO 2008; datasheet 6).  The vast 
majority of these new mortgages were reliant on more than one income, tying the 
household unit into a new work and family lifestyle.  Moreover, loans to developers 
for land and developments sky-rocketed.  As Honohan (2010: 26) notes, “At the end-
2003, net indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world was just 10 per cent of 
GDP; by early 2008 borrowing, mainly for property, had jumped to over 60 per cent 
of GDP.  Moreover, the share of bank assets in property-related lending grew from 
less than 40 per cent before 2002 to over 60 per cent by 2006.” 
 
 
Figure 4: Irish land values 1973-2006 (€ per hectare) 
 
 
 
Source: Savills HOK (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 12
Figure 5: European land values by country (€ per hectare) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Savills HOK (2007) 
 
 
3. From Boom to Bust: Housing during the Financial Crisis 
From late 2006/early 2007 there has been a marked change in the Irish economy.  
GNP has fallen by an estimated 17% from its peak (Honohan 2010) and 
unemployment has almost trebled.  Whilst government and the financial sector hoped 
for a ‘soft landing’ in the housing market, the reality was the market was so over-
inflated it constituted an enormous bubble that inevitably would be popped.  And pop 
it did. 
 
The daft.ie house price report for 2009 detailed that asking prices, based on stock 
advertised through its services, were down on average c.19% in 2009, on top of a 
decrease of almost 15% in 2008.  The average asking price for a residential property 
was just over €242,000, €110,000 below the peak.  The drop in asking price varies 
geographically, with the smallest drop in County Limerick (22%) and largest drop in 
Dublin city centre, where prices were down 42.5% (approx 37.7% for all of Dublin 
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City)  from their peak at the end of 2009 (see Figure 6; datasheet 7).  The Permanent 
TSB/ESRI Index reported in April 2010 that the average national prices, based on 
mortgage data, had fallen to the end of April 2002 levels, with a 34% decrease in 
prices since they peaked in Quarter 4 2006, falling from €311,078 to €204,830 
(outside of Dublin from €267,484 to €183,309 (-31.4%); in Dublin from €427,946 to 
€250,872 (-41.3%)) (datasheet 8; also Figure 3 and datasheet 4).  Many economic 
commentators are now predicting that house prices will fall 40-60% from peak values 
(e.g., M. Kelly 2009; Whelan 2010a).  Similarly, rents fell for seven quarters in a row 
to Q1 2010, with private rents being almost 25% below their peak value in Q2 2008 
(DKM 2010). 
 
Further, there has been a steep decline in land values since the height of the boom.  
For example, in late 2009 the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA) 
estimated that the 24.9 acre Irish Glass Bottle site in Ringsend (bought for €412m in 
2006) is presently worth €50m (a drop of 87%), while its Long Term Economic Value 
(LTEV) is €62.5m.  This is a prime city centre site with high development potential, 
and other sites have taken similar falls in value.  For those sites outside of the urban 
centres, it is questionable as to whether these lands, in the short to medium term, will 
return to the prices paid for them, reverting to agricultural prices.  Knight Frank 
Ireland (2010) detail that the national average price paid for farmland in 2009 was 
€9,678 (€11,236 per acre if one excludes one very large transaction of 1,540 acres in 
Clare), a drop of 43.3 per cent on the average price of €17,081 per acre in 2008. The 
biggest fall in value was in the Dublin-Kildare-Wicklow region where prices dropped 
by 56.6 percent (Figure 7; datasheet 9). 
 
DKM (2009) reports that from 2006 to 2009(est.) the total value of construction 
output fell from €37,611m to €19,857 (a drop of 47.2%; see Figure 8; datasheet 10).  
Further, the number of construction workers fell from their Q2 2007 peak of 269,600 
to 155,400 in Q2 2009 (CSO 2009b; datasheet 10), and as of June 2010 were 
estimated to be 129,000 (Press Association 2010).  Property related tax receipts 
(stamp duty, capital gains tax, VAT, development levies) have also dropped 
dramatically given the much smaller percentage of sales and the reduction in new 
commencements.  For example, for the period January to end of December 2009, 
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stamp duty intake was €929m, down from €1,650m for the same period in 2008, a 
drop of 43.7% (Dept of Finance 2009; datasheet 10). 
 
Figure 6:  Fall in asking prices from the market peak to December 2009 
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Figure 7: Average price of farmland 2001-2009 (€ per acre) 
 
 
Source: Frank Knight (2010)  
 
 
Figure 8: Construction output, 2000-2009E 
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Source: DKM (2009) 
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A key factor driving down house and land prices is not simply a lack of confidence or 
difficulties in accessing credit, but a marked oversupply of housing stock and zoned 
land.  Ireland was in the middle of a building and land speculation frenzy when the 
crisis initiated.  The DEHLG records that there were 88,419 housing completions in 
2006 (recorded as 93,419, but 5,000 were delayed reporting from 2005; see Figure 9).  
This high level of production continued into 2007 (78,027 units), slowing 
dramatically in 2008 (51,724 units) and 2009 (26,420 units).  All told, there were 
244,590 units built between January 2006 and December 2009 (that were connected to 
the ESB electricity grid) (datasheet 3).  This is despite the fact that in April 2006, the 
Census revealed that 266,322 housing units were unoccupied (216,533 vacant units 
and 49,789 holiday homes; 15% of stock; datasheet 11).  The result was a significant 
volume of property coming onto an oversupplied market at a time when it was at first 
softening and then outright plummeting.  According to irishpropertywatch.com in 
May 2010, 112,506 housing units were for sale in Ireland (both new and secondhand) 
and another 20,463 available for rent.  Given the oversupply and the flat market, 
planning permissions granted were down 63.9% in 2009, housing registrations are 
down 95% since their peak in September 2006, and housing commencements are 
down 90% on their peak in 2005 (DKM 2010). 
 
Figure 9: House completions in Ireland, 1993-2009 
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Source: DEHLG  
(N.B. 5000 of the completions recorded in 2006 were completed in 2005)  
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4. The Present Rate of Oversupply of Housing and Zoned Land 
Calculating the level of oversupply in the Irish housing market is not straightforward 
due to the paucity of data - vacancy rates are only measured every five years through 
the Census, and potential oversupply is not measured at all.  To date, there have been 
four studies that have sought to estimate present rates of vacancy and oversupply (see 
Table 1), plus an estimate of the oversupply of brand new, unsold homes (c.40K) by 
the CIF (Construction Industry Federation; CIF 2009).  Two other estimates – Derek 
Brawn (2009) and propertypin.com - also place overall vacancy (inc. holiday homes) 
at over 330,000, but do not provide detailed workings, nor an estimate of oversupply.  
Excluding the CIF estimate, there is general alignment between the estimates 
produced by ourselves (NIRSA), UCD (Williams et al. 2010), DKM/DEHLG (2009) 
and Goodbody (pers comms; Hennessy 2010).  All four organisations estimate that 
vacancy including holiday homes is over 300K, that vacancy excluding holiday 
homes is over 228K, and that the potential oversupply is over 103K (and if the top 
rates are used for DKM/DEHLG and Goodbody then the alignment is relatively 
strong). 
 
Table 1: Comparison of housing vacancy rate studies (as of 2009) 
 
 (1) Vacancy 
(inc holiday 
homes) 
(2) Holiday 
homes 
(3) Vacancy 
(exc. 
holiday 
homes)  
(4) Base 
vacancya 
(5) 
Obsolb 
(6) Potential 
oversupplyc 
DKM/DEHLG 301,682-
326,685 
73,476 228,206-
253,209 
106,177 - 122,029-
147,032 
Goodbody 302,475-
343,480 
73,000 229,475-
270,480 
126,189 - 103,286-
144,291 
NIRSA 352,414 
(338,031)d 
49,789 
(86,002)e 
302,625K 
(252,029) 
 
(87,356)f 
 
(44,425) 
 
(120,248) 
UCD 345,116 64,520 280,596 98,980 9,898 171,178 
 
Notes: 
a) Base vacancy refers to the expected underlying rate of vacancy normal in any housing market. 
b) Obsolescence refers to the expected number of houses falling out of the live stock because 
they are no longer habitable or change from residential use. 
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c) Oversupply is the number of units in excess of the base vacancy rate.  In Table 1, oversupply 
(6) is calculated thus: (6)=(1)-(2)-(4)-(5) 
d) NIRSA has employed two different methods in its analysis.  The first method (not in brackets) 
used house completion, address database and new mortgage data to estimate vacancy, but not 
potential oversupply.  The estimate of 302K includes undercounted holiday homes but did not 
estimate how many there were.  A subsequent analysis to calculate potential oversupply used a 
projection of population household growth based on 96-06 household change, factoring in 
obsolescence and holiday home rates, so as to be able to estimate county rates (new mortgage 
data is not available at county level).  The two different methods lead to slightly different 
estimates of vacancy excluding holiday homes due to the estimation of their number (see note 
e), but overall vacancy including holiday homes is about the same. 
e) Using the second approach, NIRSA estimated the total number of holiday homes at the end of 
2009 as c.86K (using the DKM method of 5% of total stock in 2006 based on the 2005 
Household Budget Survey [73K], and 5% of potentially available stock between Apr 06-09 
[13K]).   
f) This is not the base vacancy, but the excess vacant stock in the 2006 Census (216,533) above 
an expected 6% base rate of total stock (106,177) minus 23,000 undercounted holiday homes 
(5% total 2006 stock would be 73,000 not 49,789). 
 
The differences between the estimates are due to two factors: method and 
assumptions.  All four studies use the Census 2006 as their starting point.  The Census 
reported that there were 174,935 houses and 41,598 apartments vacant (not including 
temporarily vacant on census night), plus 49,798 holiday homes.  All four studies also 
use housing completion data and new mortgages on new homes data (both sourced 
from the DEHLG) to calculate vacancy excluding holiday homes to the end of 2009, 
with UCD also using population projections.  DEHLG data detail that there were 
133,270 loans approved by banks, building societies and local authorities for new 
houses built between January 2006 and end of 2009 (datasheet 12, see Figure 10).  
There were 244,590 housing units built in the same period, meaning that 54.5 percent 
of the properties built in this period have a mortgage and 45.5 percent are either 
vacant or have no loan against them.  With respect to calculating potential oversupply, 
DKM/DEHLG and Goodbody use new mortgage data on new properties, along with 
an estimate of how many properties have been bought without a mortgage; NIRSA 
and UCD use household projections, holiday home demand, and obsolescence.  All 
four organisations use slightly different assumptions with respect to holiday home 
rates, obsolescence rates, how many houses were bought without a mortgage, how 
many newly bought houses are occupied, and expected underlying vacancy rate (e.g., 
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with regards to the latter, UCD use 5%, DKM/DEHLG and NIRSA 6%, and 
Goodbody’s 7.3% [the European average, skewed upwards by Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland]).  For comparison, as noted in the UCD (2010) report, the base vacancy rate 
in the UK is 3.4% and in the Netherlands 3.2% (in other words, all four studies use 
generous base vacancy rates). 
 
Figure 10: Loans approved by Banks, Building Societies and Local Authorities 
for new build stock 2006-2009 
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Whilst the UCD report provides estimates for the Dublin region, our own analysis is 
the only study to estimate county rates of potential vacancy and oversupply.  The 
model, detailed in Table 2 (datasheet 13), is relatively straightforward, using Census 
2006 and DEHLG house completion data to estimate total stock (supply), and Census 
1996 and 2006 to calculate potential households (demand), factoring in holiday home 
rates and expected obsolescence.  The total stock of available housing (G) is 
calculated by adding together vacant stock above an expected 6% vacancy rate (D) 
and the total new build in a county between April 2006 and December 2009 (E), and 
subtracting the running cumulative obsolescence total (at a rate of 6/1000 per annum – 
a generous rate given the age profile of Irish housing stock) expected between April 
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2006 and December 2009 (F).  The estimated demand (M) is calculated by 
determining the household growth between 1996 and 2006 (J), projecting forward 
household growth between April 2006 and December 2009 based on the same rate of 
increase (K), and adding potential holiday home demand (L) (calculated as 5% of 
total stock).  Potential oversupply is calculated by subtracting potential demand (M) 
from estimated supply (G).  To provide some context as to the extent of potential 
oversupply we have calculated how long available stock would last (O) if the number 
of households continued to grow at the rate they did between 1996 and 2006 
(representing somewhat of a best case scenario given that household growth has 
slowed in recent years and may well be falling given the recent growth in emigration).  
Whilst the model does not take account of local effects such as development plans or 
strategic investments, or the functioning of local labour markets, it nevertheless 
provides a robust estimate of oversupply based on existing data.   
 
At the global level, the model suggests that given the household increase 1996-2006 
and potential holiday home demand there was a need to supply 139,784 units in the 
period April 2006 and December 2009 (126,782 units to accommodate new 
households; 13,002 houses for holiday homes).  There were 87,356 vacant surplus 
stock above the 6% rate in Apr 2006, and 217,101 houses built between Apr 06-Dec 
09, and during the same period we would expect 44,425 to become obsolete (giving a 
total potential available stock of 260,032).  This would indicate that as of the end of 
2009 there was a potential surplus stock of 120,248 units.  This stock would last on 
average 3.5 years if household growth continued to rise at the same rate as it did 
between 1996 and 2006 (a period of rapid growth which is not being mirrored at the 
present time) and the stock was appropriately distributed around the country vis-à-vis 
potential demand (which it is not).   
 
There is considerable local variation in potential oversupply rates, with some counties 
having relatively low levels of potential oversupply and others having several years 
worth of stock.  For example, the local authorities surrounding Dublin City (Fingal, 
Kildare, Meath, South Dublin, Wicklow) have constructed housing approximately in 
line with demand, and it is likely that when the Dublin economy starts to recover 
excess housing will be absorbed within a few months (although there is a relatively 
large stock of vacant investment properties that might flood onto the market – 
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Tenant’s First (2009), citing the IAVI, report that there are 40,000 of these in Dublin 
alone).  However, Dublin City and Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown, like Cork City, have 
constructed units far in excess of the demand experienced during the Celtic Tiger 
years.  To some degree this oversupply is the result of unfortunate timing, as much of 
this build was part of a broader programme of planned urban development, renewal 
and densification, though the scale of development was overly ambitious given 
previous rates of growth.  Similarly, counties in the north midlands and along the 
border (Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Longford, Mayo, Roscommon, Sligo) have 
constructed far more houses than one would expect demographically, though the 
reason is quite different.  Based on the model, Leitrim and Longford both have 
housing stocks that would take over ten years to fill if households grew at the 1996-
2006 rate.  The reason for this is clear if one plots the vacancy rate in 2006 (as 
recorded in the Census) against the percentage increase in stock between 2006 and 
2009 (as recorded by the DEHLG) (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Percentage of increase in housing stock 2006-2009 in relation to 
vacancy (exc. holiday homes) in 2006 
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Table 2: A model of housing vacancy and potential oversupply in Ireland 
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
Carlow 20135 2167 874 3,073 512 3,435 12356 17232 4876 1785 172 1956 1479 3.0 
Dublin City 223098 25981 10482 19,533 5510 24,505 173085 191639 18554 6791 1225 8016 16489 8.9 
Dun LR 77508 6868 2771 7,723 1922 8,572 61649 68560 6911 2529 429 2958 5614 8.1 
Fingal 89909 7645 3084 12,053 2277 12,860 47721 80540 32819 12012 643 12655 205 0.1 
South Dublin 87484 5393 2176 7,897 2170 7,902 61809 80715 18906 6920 395 7315 587 0.3 
Kildare 68840 6722 2712 9,106 1742 10,075 39041 61083 22042 8067 504 8571 1504 0.7 
Kilkenny 34353 3702 1493 4,326 863 4,956 22371 29774 7403 2709 248 2957 1998 2.7 
Laoighis 27079 4137 1669 5,337 704 6,302 15672 22627 6955 2546 315 2861 3442 4.9 
Longford 15868 3262 1316 3,484 415 4,385 9410 12134 2724 997 219 1216 3169 11.6 
Louth 45488 5532 2232 5,316 1137 6,411 28207 38786 10579 3872 321 4192 2218 2.1 
Meath 61257 6139 2477 8,245 1542 9,179 31863 54021 22158 8110 459 8569 610 0.3 
Offaly 27591 3330 1343 3,510 695 4,159 17510 23821 6311 2310 208 2518 1641 2.6 
Westmeath 32817 4744 1914 4,485 828 5,571 19216 27137 7921 2899 279 3178 2393 3.0 
Wexford 58970 6091 2457 8,454 1493 9,419 31502 45684 14182 5191 471 5662 3757 2.6 
Wicklow 49088 4421 1784 4,921 1218 5,486 31263 43005 11742 4298 274 4572 914 0.8 
Clare 48834 6187 2496 6,244 1229 7,510 29247 38401 9154 3350 376 3726 3785 4.1 
Cork City 51441 6167 2488 3,579 1257 4,810 41452 44088 2636 965 241 1205 3605 13.7 
Cork County 150659 18261 7367 20,539 3799 24,107 88933 123627 34694 12698 1205 13903 10204 2.9 
Kerry 65913 10376 4186 8,114 1658 10,642 39302 48408 9106 3333 532 3865 6777 7.4 
Limerick City 23065 2913 1175 1,049 559 1,665 17054 19603 2549 933 83 1016 648 2.5 
Limerick  Co. 52677 6301 2542 6,459 1323 7,678 33486 44778 11292 4133 384 4517 3162 2.8 
North Tipp 27303 3107 1253 3,558 685 4,127 17771 23034 5263 1926 206 2133 1994 3.8 
South Tipp 34206 4024 1623 3,653 853 4,424 23440 29466 6026 2206 221 2427 1997 3.3 
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Waterford City 20522 2925 1180 1,422 505 2,098 13630 17110 3480 1274 105 1379 719 2.1 
Waterford Co. 27019 3748 1512 3,678 681 4,509 16096 21583 5487 2008 225 2234 2276 4.1 
Galway City 30589 3779 1525 2,318 755 3,087 17334 25502 8168 2989 154 3144 -56 -0.1 
Galway  Co. 67737 10616 4283 10,432 1724 12,990 38849 53510 14661 5366 650 6015 6975 4.8 
Leitrim 15282 3281 1324 2,945 397 3,871 8374 10672 2298 841 194 1035 2836 12.3 
Mayo 58717 10082 4067 7,280 1473 9,875 34624 43578 8954 3277 494 3771 6104 6.8 
Roscommon 26979 4947 1996 4,373 691 5,678 16513 20794 4281 1567 284 1851 3828 8.9 
Sligo 28751 5108 2061 4,105 730 5,436 17629 21556 3927 1437 272 1709 3727 9.5 
Cavan 28250 5218 2105 5,506 735 6,876 16321 21987 5666 2074 344 2418 4458 7.9 
Donegal 70526 10768 4344 11,324 1795 13,874 39312 50559 11247 4116 694 4810 9064 8.1 
Monaghan 21658 2591 1045 3,061 548 3,558 15276  18704  3428 1255 178 1433 2125 6.2 
State 1769613 216533 87356 217101 44425 260032 1127318 1473718 346,400 126782 13002 139784 120248 3.5 
 
A County I household nos. 2006 (Census) 
B Total housing stock 2006 (Census) J Household no. growth 96-06 
C Total vacancy 2006 exc. hol. homes, temp abs and visit occs (Census) K Homes required Apr 06-Dec 09   
D Surplus of vacant units above 6% base rate, minus 23000 surplus holiday homes (DoEHLG) L Potential holiday home demand (5%) 
E Total new build Apr 06-Dec 09 (DOEHLG) M Total potential demand 
F Replacement obsolescence at 6 per 1000/annum N Potential oversupply 
G Total available stock Apr 06-Dec 09 O Potential no. of years oversupply (if households grow at 96-06 rate) 
H household nos. 1996 (Census)   
What Figure 11 illustrates is that house building in Ireland was running counter to 
what one would expect given the vacancy rate.  Those counties that had the highest 
rates of vacant stock in 2006 subsequently increased their housing stock by the 
greatest percentage in the following years, and those counties with low vacancy, 
increased their stock the least.  For example, Longford with a vacancy rate in 2006 of 
20.6% (excluding holiday homes) increased its housing stock by 22% between April 
2006 and December 2009 from 15,868 units to 19,352 units, and Leitrim with a 
vacancy rate in 2006 of 21.5% (excluding holiday homes) increased its housing stock 
by 19.3% between 2006 and 2009 from 15,284 units to 18,229 units (datasheet 13, 
datasheet 14).  To put that in context, in the ten years between 1996 and 2006, the 
number of households in Longford increased by 28.9% (from 8,410 to 12,134) and in 
Leitrim by 27.4% (from 8,374 to 10,672) (datasheet 14).  The house building rate 
between April 2006 and December 2009, if continued for a ten year period, would 
have catered for a household increase of 59.9% in Longford and 52.6% in Leitrim.  In 
other words, both counties were building approximately twice what would have been 
required assuming household numbers increased at the 1996-2006 rate, and that does 
not take into account vacancy rates.   
 
What is revealed in Figure 11 are the effects of Upper Shannon Rural Renewal 
Scheme, inaugurated in June 1998, with Longford, Leitrim, Cavan, Sligo and 
Roscommon all being major beneficiaries of this tax incentive programme (see Figure 
18).  In total, these five counties increased their housing stock by 45,053 (49.8%) 
between 2002 and 2009, from 90,491 to 135,544 dwellings, with 1 in 3 houses built in 
this period (datasheet 23).  Between the 1996 and 2006 censuses 30,695 houses were 
built in these counties and yet household numbers only grew by 18,896 – in other 
words, house building was progressing at a pace well in excess of household growth.  
Figure 12 illustrates the effect of the scheme on house building, with a dramatic rise 
in the number of units being completed, especially in period 2003-2007.  In short, 
whilst the programme sought to ‘encourage people to reside in the area and to 
promote new economic activity’ (Dept of Finance 1999), it completely distorted the 
usual pattern of house building, and has led to a large oversupply of housing stock. 
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Figure 12: House completions in the five counties included in the Upper Shannon 
Rural Renewal Scheme 
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 Source: DEHLG (2010) 
 
In parallel with the house building boom has been a growth in the zoning of serviced 
land by local authorities for residential use.  In June 2008, the DEHLG recorded that 
there were 14,191 hectares of land zoned nationwide for 462,709 potential new units 
(datasheet 15).  Since 2008 The Irish Independent reports that there has been a zoning 
bonanza as vested interests sought to zone land ahead of the new Planning and 
Development (Amendment) Bill, detailing that, as of May 2010, there are 33,000 
hectares of land zoned for 1,086,119 new units (Melia and Hogan 2010).  Working 
with the 2008 data, it is clear that there has been a massive over-zoning of land in 
some counties, far in excess of potential need.  Table 3 (datasheet 15) details a simple 
model to estimate the extent of over-zoning, calculating how long existing zoned land 
would last if the number of households continued to grow at the 1996-2006 rate 
(which would have been the conditions under which most of the land was zoned).  We 
have also calculated the percentage of zoned units to existing residential units.  Note, 
that the model takes no account of the potential holiday home demand or 
obsolescence.   
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Table 3: A model of land zoning in Ireland 
 
A B C D E F G H I 
Carlow 197 3,210 20135 15.9 4876 6.6 3.0 9.6 
Cavan 689 14,256 28250 50.5 5666 25.2 7.9 33.0 
Clare 651 16,520 48834 33.8 9154 18.0 4.1 22.2 
Cork County   1,000 23,516 150659 15.6 34694 6.8 2.9 9.7 
Cork City Co 175 13,264 51441 25.8 2636 50.3 13.7 64.0 
Donegal 588 18,288 70526 25.9 11247 16.3 8.1 24.3 
D/L-R 428 26,793 77508 34.6 6911 38.8 8.1 46.9 
Fingal  511 19,361 89909 21.5 32819 5.9 0.1 6.0 
South Dublin  797 37,477 87484 42.8 18906 19.8 0.3 20.1 
Dublin City 472 65,389 223098 29.3 18554 35.2 8.9 44.1 
Galway Co  576 14,897 67737 22.0 14661 10.2 4.8 14.9 
Galway City 267 6,402 30589 20.9 8168 7.8 -0.1 7.8 
Kerry 919 21,622 65913 32.8 9106 23.7 7.4 31.2 
Kildare 688 20,992 68840 30.5 22042 9.5 0.7 10.2 
Kilkenny 497 12,252 34353 35.7 7403 16.6 2.7 19.2 
Laois 149 3,742 27079 13.8 6955 5.4 4.9 10.3 
Leitrim 330 5,853 15282 38.3 2298 25.5 12.3 37.8 
Limerick Co 262 6,072 52677 11.5 11292 5.4 2.8 8.2 
Limerick City 113 4,382 23065 19.0 2549 17.2 2.5 19.7 
Longford 253 6,601 15868 41.6 2724 24.2 11.6 35.9 
Louth 198 8,197 45488 18.0 10579 7.7 2.1 9.8 
Mayo 319 7,039 58717 12.0 8954 7.9 6.8 14.7 
Meath 112 8,182 61257 13.4 22158 3.7 0.3 4.0 
Monaghan 759 18,147 21658 83.8 3428 52.9 6.2 59.1 
North Tipp 174 3,856 27303 14.1 5263 7.3 3.8 11.1 
Offaly 425 9,981 27591 36.2 6311 15.8 2.6 18.4 
Roscommon 779 15,580 26979 57.7 4281 36.4 8.9 45.3 
Sligo 322 8,468 28751 29.5 3927 21.6 9.5 31.1 
South Tipp 400 7,287 34206 21.3 6026 12.1 3.3 15.4 
Waterford Co 146 3,099 27019 11.5 5487 5.6 4.1 9.8 
Waterford City 171 5,595 20522 27.3 3480 16.1 2.1 18.1 
Westmeath 356 12,290 32817 37.5 7921 15.5 3.0 18.5 
Wexford  358 9,208 58970 15.6 14182 6.5 2.6 9.1 
Wicklow 112 4,891 49088 10.0 11742 4.2 0.8 4.9 
 14,191 462,709 1769613 26.1 346400 13.4 3.5 16.8 
  
A County & City Councils 
B Hectares of serviced, zoned land Jun 2008 
C Number of units zoned for, June 2008 
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D Total housing 2006 
E % of zoned for housing to existing housing in 2006 
F 96-06 household growth 
G Potential no. of years supply of zoned land (if households grow at 96-06 rate) 
H Potential no. of years oversupply (if households grow at 96-06 rate) (see Table 2) 
I Potential no. of years zoned land + housing oversupply (if households grow 96-06 rate)
 
What the data reveal is that whilst some counties have a relatively small bank of 
zoned land, others have zoned vast hectares of land far in excess of any kind of 
reasonable expectation with regards to short to medium term demand.  For example, 
in June 2008, Monaghan, which had a stock of 21,658 houses in 2006, and a potential 
surplus of 2,143 homes at the end of 2009, has enough land zoned for an additional 
18,147 units, which would cater for a household increase of 83% and last over 50 
years if households grew at the 1996-2006 rate.  And many other local authorities 
demonstrate a similarly excessive profile.  Figure 13 details how many years surplus 
housing plus zoned land in June 2008 would last if households continued to grow at 
the 1996-2006 rate, with a national average of 16.8 years, with over half of all local 
authorities in excess of this.  If the number of years of surplus housing are plotted 
against the length of time zoned land would last it is evident that those counties with 
highest levels of excess housing also have the most zoned land (see Figure 14).   
 
In the Irish case then there is a very odd pattern emerging - those local authorities that 
had the most vacant stock in 2006, subsequently built the most housing, now have the 
highest surpluses, and have the most land zoned for future use.  What the data makes 
clear is that a number of local authorities have essentially ignored good planning 
guidelines and regional and national objectives; sensible demographic profiling of 
potential demand; and the fact that much of the land zoned lacks essential services 
such as water and sewerage treatment plants, energy supply, public transport or roads 
(Melia and Hogan 2010). Instead, permissions and zoning have been driven by the 
demands of local people, developers and speculators; the abandonment of basic 
planning principles by elected representatives; and ambitious, localised growth plans 
framed within a zero-sum game of potentially being left behind with respect to 
development.  Further, central government actively encouraged its excesses through 
tax incentive schemes and failed to adequately oversee, regulate and direct local 
planning. 
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Figure 13: Estimated years supply of surplus housing and zoned land per county 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Land zoned (years) in relation to surplus housing supply (years) 
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Collectively, the data we have presented in this section demonstrate that housing and 
land supply and household demand became uncoupled from early on in the Celtic 
Tiger era and progressively grew further apart.  This is abundantly clear from 
comparing housing completions with household growth between 1996 and 2006.  
While 553,267 housing units were built between January 1996 and December 2005, 
the number of households grew by only 346,400 between April 1996 and April 2006.  
An additional 244,590 units were built between January 2006 and December 2009, 
and yet the number of households did not increase by anywhere near the same 
amount.  The number of households in June 2008 was 1.58m (CSO 2009d), up 
110,000 from 1.47m in April 2006, and growth is presently thought to be static or 
falling given rising emigration.  All through the boom years the vacancy rate was 
rising - in 1996 the rate was 8.5%, in 2002 it was 9.8%, and in 2006 it was 15% 
(includes holiday homes).  The 2006 rate is double the EU average rate of 7.3% 
(skewed upwards by Spain, Portugal and Ireland) and is way in excess of what one 
would expect as an acceptable base rate (3-4%).  Even accounting for obsolescence 
and replacement, and holiday homes, it is obvious that there is presently a wide 
disparity between the total stock of housing and the number of households (in 
December 2009, Geodirectory reported that there were 1.98m residential units in the 
state). 
 
5. Ghost Estates 
One result of housing supply being out of sync with housing demand has been the 
creation of a new phenomenon, so-called ‘ghost estates’.  We have defined a ghost 
estate as a development of ten or more houses where 50% of the properties are either 
vacant or under-construction.  Using that definition we have analyzed the 
Geodirectory database in order to identify all properties built post-2005 where 10 or 
more units share the same estate/street address and more than 50 percent are coded as 
either vacant or under-construction.  We have then undertaken a ground-truthing 
exercise using two methods.  First, we have cross-checked the results with house sale 
websites such as daft.ie and myhome.ie.  Second, we have visited 60 of the estates in 
three locations (South Dublin/Kildare, South Leitrim/North Roscommon, Cork City 
and county) to verify their status.  It is important to note that ghost estates vary 
markedly in their condition, from sites that are 100% under-construction through to 
completed estates that are finished and fully serviced (see Figure 15). 
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Figure 15:  Example ghost estates 
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The total number of ghost estates developed post-2005 identified by this method is 
620, and includes 19,262 units, 11,670 of which are vacant and 3,823 are under-
construction (with average vacant/under-construction rate of 80%).  There are 86 
estates with more than 50 properties (of which more than 50% are vacant/under-
construction), 252 with between 21-50 properties, and 282 between 10-20 properties. 
Having driven round the towns we visited it is clear to us that our method under-
counts ghost estates, most probably because the Geodirectory database under-records 
vacancy and under-construction as they have to maintain this status for quite a while 
to be coded as such and they are still engaged in a rolling process of identifying 
vacant properties.  There is some noise in the data because they are only collected 
twice a year in urban areas and once a year in rural areas, meaning that units in some 
estates will have been sold, although in the vast majority of cases this does not move 
them under the 50% threshold.  The number of estates would certainly increase if we 
were to change the parameters down to a 30% vacancy/under-construction rate, 
depending on how we want to define a ghost estate. 
 
As Figure 16 reveals, there are multiples of ghost estates in every county in the state.  
Simply detailing the number of estates per county, however, can give a false 
impression because it takes no account of the size of the overall population (datasheet 
24).  Whilst Cork County (not including the Cork City area) has 90 ghost estates, it 
had a population of 361,788 in 2006. Leitrim has 21 estates, but a population of 
28,950. We have therefore standardised the number of estates by per 1,000 head of 
population (see Figure 17).  Leitrim (21 estates), Longford (19) and Roscommon (35) 
have a particularly high ratio of estates per head of population, indicating that these 
estates constitute an oversupply in the market.  This is perhaps unsurprising given that 
it was these counties who built the most properties in relation to their overall stock 
and vacancy levels between 2006 and 2009 (see Figure 11).  These are followed by 
Sligo (24), Cavan (21), Monaghan (18), Carlow (15), Cork County (90), Tipperary 
North (16), Kilkenny (21), Westmeath (18), and Laois (15). Whilst some estates are 
vacant holiday home developments, they nevertheless are presently surplus to demand 
and are unlikely to be purchased in the short term whilst the market is still trying to 
find its bottom.     
Figure 16: Post-2005 ghost estates in Ireland 
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Figure 17: Ghost estates per county by head of population  
 
 
 
 
The presence of these estates in the Irish landscape raises some difficult questions. 
Whilst demand for housing might return relatively quickly in urban areas when the 
economy picks up, and such estates might be used to deal with the social housing 
waiting list, it is likely that demand driven by demographic change will be weak in 
rural counties given that recessions generally lead to rural out-migration and slower 
recovery.  It therefore seems likely that many properties in rural areas will remain 
empty for quite some time (as noted in our model, Table 2, this could be over 10 years 
in some locations).  Demographic forecasts would suggest population growth will 
occur over the long term in Ireland, and one would anticipate population levels to rise 
in the future in both rural and urban areas. There are questions, however, as to 
whether the houses built in rural areas, in particular, will be fit for purpose by the time 
the market returns.  In the meantime, for those residing on such estates there are 
clearly social and economic concerns about living with few neighbours and/or on 
estates that are abandoned construction sites, with no street-lighting, pavements, or 
finished green areas, often in locations that lack amenities, services and public 
transport, and owning houses that are massively in negative equity. 
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6. Explaining the Irish Housing Bubble 
 
There were a number of important factors that contributed to the huge growth in 
housing supply during the Celtic Tiger years and the subsequent development of a 
highly over-inflated property bubble.   
 
Firstly, the demography of the country has undergone significant change from the 
early 1990s requiring the construction of an expanded and diversified housing stock.  
Between 1991 and 2006 the population of Ireland grew by 714,129 (20.25%) from 
3.525m to 4.239m, with the number of households growing by 440,437, up from 
1.029m to 1.473m (CSO 2006; datasheet 16).  The growth in population was driven 
by both immigration and natural increase.  For example, between 1996 and 2006 
628,800 people moved to Ireland (a proportion of whom were returning Irish) and 
285,000 people emigrated, giving a net migration of 343,800 (CSO 2009c; datasheet 
17).  Household growth was also driven by household fragmentation.  Indeed, 
household composition has altered quite significantly in Ireland since the foundation 
of the state.  Whilst the population has risen from 2.97m in 1926 to 4.24m in 2006 
(43% growth), the number of households has grown from 622k in 1926 to 1.47m in 
2006 (136% growth), with average household size falling from 4.48 persons in 1926 
to 2.81 persons in 2006 (datasheet 16).   
 
Second, the desire for home ownership and buy-to-let or flip speculation drove 
demand.  Ireland has a relatively high rate of home ownership, with almost three 
quarters of private dwellings in the State being owner-occupied in 2006.  Indeed, there 
is a strong cultural imperative to own one’s home that has undoubtedly contributed to 
new purchasers over-extending their credit in order to step onto the housing ladder.  In 
2006, over 1 in 3 (498,432; 34%) of all households owned their dwelling outright, 
another 569,966 (39%) were paying a home loan or mortgage, and 23,547 (1.61%) 
were purchasing the property from a local authority (CSO 2009; datasheet 18).  
301,306 dwellings were rented, of which 105,509 were rented from a local authorities.  
With so much property in the hands of home owners and landlords, the proportion of 
housing stock owned and maintained by local authorities has fallen consistently from 
18.4% in 1961 to 6.9% in 2002, rising slightly to 7.2% in 2006 (CSO 2002, CSO 
2009a).  As a consequence, the housing boom was almost exclusively targeted at the 
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home owners and investors, with: first time buyers feeling harried to get onto the 
property ladder at all costs (driven by arguments such as ‘being left behind’ and ‘rent 
is dead money’); existing home owners encouraged to take advantage of the equity in 
their homes to scale-up or purchase second or holiday homes or release equity to 
enable their children to get onto the housing ladder; and small investors encouraged to 
invest in buy-to-let purchases as a long term, secure investments that lacked the 
volatility of stocks and shares.  The latter group were particularly important in 
keeping demand high and pushing up prices.  By 2007, the Bank of Ireland Group 
were lending as much money to buy-to-let and flip speculators (28%) as to first time 
buyers, with the Irish Banking Federation noting that they typically paid c.€100,000 
more on a property purchase (Brawn 2009).  Hooke and MacDonald (as reported by 
Brawn 2009) estimated that 27% of new homes in 2007 were being bought by 
speculators, suggesting that approximately one in four houses at the height of the 
boom had no immediate party to occupy it. 
 
Third, housing and planning policy, along with a weak and fragmented planning 
system, on the one hand encouraged development through tax incentives and the pro-
growth orientation of local authorities keen to leverage development levies, and on the 
other failed to integrate plans across scales and lacked sufficient checks and balances.  
Bartley (2007) argues that Ireland entered a third phase of planning from the mid-
1980s onwards, with a shift from a managerial approach designed to facilitate 
modernization to an entrepreneurial approach designed to be more pragmatic and 
results-oriented, attracting inward investment and facilitating areal regeneration.  This 
change in approach has led to piecemeal development and a planning system 
consisting of 88 local planning authorities: 29 County Councils, 5 County Borough 
Corporations, 5 Borough Corporations and 49 Town Councils (Grist, 2003).  
Moreover, planning, spatial strategies, housing need, and tax incentive schemes were 
overseen by a range of agencies and were rarely considered contextually or as being 
interdependent.  As a result, there has been a lack of joined-up thinking and action by 
housing, planning and development agencies at national and local levels, and an 
inability to respond strategically to demographic and economic pressures.  This has 
been accompanied by a laissez-faire approach to planning, which held a presumption 
for development, forewent traditional planning tools such as greenbelts, and gave 
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ready access to land, zoning and planning permissions, along with little to no 
regulation concerning land purchases.   
 
Early in the boom, Ireland suffered a housing crisis wherein demand was outstripping 
supply, especially in and around the cities, which were experiencing sustained 
household growth, house price inflation (see Figure 3), and a rise in the cost of living.  
In response, the Department of Environment and Local Government (DoELG), 
commissioned a series of housing studies (referred to as the 'Bacon Reports' - Bacon 
and Associates, 1998; 1999; and 2000) and introduced Part V into the Planning & 
Development Act, 2000, which required all local authorities to adopt a housing 
strategy in their County Development Plan and to allocate up to 20% of all new 
residential developments of four or more dwellings in zoned land for social and/or 
affordable housing. A key goal of Part V of the Act was to disincentivise residential 
segregation and encourage integrated, mixed housing (in social and tenure terms). 
This part of the Act was constitutionally challenged in the Supreme Court by 
developers and construction industry leaders who claimed that the state was 
intervening beyond its remit into the private housing market.  Despite protests against 
the Act, Part V was deemed constitutional and went ahead as originally legislated, 
although it was amended two years later so that developers, in certain circumstances, 
could substitute land or money in lieu of including the required social and/or 
affordable housing in their private developments, thus undermining local authority 
provision and foregrounding the developer-led nature of the construction industry and 
housing sector at the time.  The ability of vested interests to routinely overturn 
strategies designed to support the public benefit is indicative of the loose and mutable 
arrangements in the Irish policy sphere. 
 
In addition, a number of pro-development tax incentive schemes were introduced 
from 1981 onwards.  Initially, the Department of Finance introduced tax incentives in 
order to promote growth and stability, particularly in inner city areas. Urban renewal 
schemes were introduced in 1985, ‘in an effort to alleviate the increasing problem of 
dereliction and dilapidation which had affected large parts on the inner areas of towns 
and cities nation-wide’ (Department of Finance, 1999). A number of urban renewal 
schemes ran from 1986 to 2008 (termination date depending on the scheme and a 
number were extended), including a Town Renewal Scheme (100 towns throughout 
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the state covered), Living Over the Shop (LOTS) and a Seaside Resort Scheme (15 
towns covered) which enabled access to Section 23 tax relief on capital expenditure 
incurred in the construction, refurbishment or conversion of rented residential 
accommodation.  It was ‘available to a person who has incurred expenditure on the 
purchase, construction, conversion or refurbishment of a qualifying property and who 
lets that property, having complied with certain conditions. … Relief for expenditure 
incurred can be set against the rent received from that property and other Irish rental 
income so that the amount of a person’s taxable income is reduced’ (Revenue 
Commissioners 2008).  Section 23 encouraged development for rental purposes 
(including holiday homes) by allowing developers and small investors to offset tax up 
to 90% of direct costs occurred against income for up to ten years. 
 
The urban tax relief schemes were accompanied from June 1998 by the Pilot Rural 
Renewal Scheme for the Upper Shannon Region (introduced under the Finance Act, 
1998, and covering Co. Cavan, west of the River Erne, all of counties Leitrim and 
Longford, north Co. Roscommon, east and south Co. Sligo; see Figure 18).  The urban 
and rural renewal schemes provided for tax relief or incentive allowances designed to 
encourage people to live and construct new dwellings in designated areas and to 
promote new economic activity. In the case of the Upper Shannon Region renewal 
scheme, for example, the two main elements were: (1) business tax incentives: tax 
relief for the expenditure incurred on the construction or refurbishment of industrial 
buildings (from July 1st, 1999); and (2) residential property tax incentives: tax relief 
for both owner occupiers and renters. In the case of owner occupiers, dwellings could 
not exceed a floor space of 210 sq metres. For those who would gain tax relief as 
tenants of property, the dwelling had to be the main or sole residence for a minimum 
of three months per annum in order to counteract the potential of a proliferation of 
holiday homes (Department of Finance, 1999).  
 
The rural renewal scheme, which ended with regards to new planning permissions in 
2004 and ran up until 2008 (with regards to complying with a binding written contract 
for the construction or refurbishment and receiving a Local Authority Certificate), 
was in place over a period of rapid demographic, social and economic change in 
Ireland.  There is little evidence to show, however, that the scheme led to increasing 
population above and beyond the demographic transition occurring, and it is likely 
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that the already existing population took up a sizeable proportion of qualifying 
dwellings (Department of Finance, 2006).  Residential property construction 
constituted 88% of expenditure, the vast bulk of which was spent on new build.  
Goodbody estimated that by the end of the scheme, some 10,596 units were due to be 
completed (Department of Finance, 2006). The scheme undoubtedly increased 
housing output, but Goodbody concluded that there had been little impact on 
economic activity in rural areas; a large proportion of the housing output was built 
speculatively and/or constitutes ‘deadweight’; excessively large dwellings were built 
in many cases; it was poor value for money; and that it had produced an oversupply of 
dwellings (Department of Finance, 2006).  Moreover, local authorities adopted a 
laissez-faire approach in its positive presumption for all housing to be permitted, 
regardless of local priorities or demographic demand or market conditions. 
 
Figure 18: The Upper Shannon Rural Renewal Scheme 
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Furthermore, the planning regime encouraged local authorities to be pro-growth 
because it enabled the accrual of development levies (in the absence of more 
sustainable local residential property taxes), with local councillors pursuing zero-sum 
games with regards to their constituency where if one area got a certain kind of 
facility or development, then their area needed the same.  Development charges per 
square metre varied enormously across the country in 2006, ranging from €7 in 
Donegal County Council to €123 in Dublin City Council (Finfacts 2006), with 
Chambers Ireland reporting that development levies had risen from €0.11bn to 
€0.55bn between 2000 and 2005, representing 13.6% of local government expenditure 
(Chambers Ireland 2006, Finfacts 2006).  Further, the planning regime had few checks 
and balances to stop excessive zoning and permissions being granted to 
developments, despite the fact that detailed demographic profiling would have 
indicated limited demand in many locations, and the absence in many cases of 
essential services such as water and sewerage treatment plants, energy supply, public 
transport or roads.  The result is a large number of one-off housing (c. 1 in 4 of stock), 
sprawl and suburbanisation, and a massive amount of zoned land.   
 
Fourth, and following on from the last point, the planning system is undermined by 
elements of clientelism, cronyism and low-level corruption at play in the system at all 
levels.  At the local scale, individuals and developers lobby and seek to curry favour 
or do deals with county councillors and constituency TDs for zoning and permissions 
in return for support, votes and remuneration of various kinds (favours, kick-backs, 
fees for ‘planning consultancy’, etc).  The Irish planning system lends itself to such a 
relationship as a result of its division of legislative and executive functions between 
councillors and planners.  The formulation and adoption of development plans and 
zoning decisions fall under the remit of elected local councillors, whilst the planning 
authority adjudicates over planning applications (with the planning authority a part of 
the local authority that local councillors oversee).  The function of local authority 
planners is as advisors on all development planning matters, rather than being formal 
decision makers; elected representatives have the final say on all development plan 
and zoning matters, and are under no obligation to take the recommendations of 
experts into account.  Moreover, councillors can use mechanisms such as Section 140 
(of the Local Government Act 2001 – formerly Section 4 of the City and County 
Management (Amendment) Act, 1955) to override a specific planning decision.  And, 
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while local authority staff are legally bound not to engage in work that might imply a 
vested interest, there is no such monitoring for councillors. This is exemplified by 
examples of elected representatives ‘double jobbing’ as planning agents (or 
consultants).  Councillors need to retain their role in the planning system as 
democratically elected local representatives working on behalf of the local 
community, but their role has be tempered where necessary to follow due process and 
be robust against accusations of clientelism and cronyism. There are undoubtedly 
many good councillors and planners in Ireland, but the system has clearly not allowed 
them to counter the excesses and pressures of the boom and practice sustainable 
planning in all instances.   
 
At the national level, developers and vested interest organisations lobby and pressure 
Ministers with respect to regional and planning policy formation and key legislation.  
The property sector thus maintains close relationships with the major political parties, 
providing funding donations, the use of services and facilities, access to elite 
networks, employment/directorships after politics, and so on, in order to influence 
development plans, zoning and planning decisions, and planning policy.  As the 
revelations of the Mahon Tribunal into planning corruption have suggested, this 
relationship has been characterised as one of mutual benefit, along with direct and 
indirect bribery and coercion of elected officials at all levels of government (see O’ 
Toole 2009).   
 
State support for the property sector is clearly evidenced by the failure of successive 
governments to implement the recommendations of the Kenny Report (Report of the 
Committee on the Price of Building Land; Government of Ireland, 1974).  The report 
was the outcome of a committee established by the Government in 1971, “as a 
response to the anarchic explosion of badly planned housing during the previous Irish 
boom of the 1960s”.  The task of the committee was “to stop landowners from getting 
windfall profits just because the local authorities zoned their agricultural fields for 
development and serviced them with sewage, roads and water”.  The report suggested 
that “a situation should [not] continue where dealings in building land can result in 
large unearned profits for individuals and where local authorities have to compete 
with private interests in order to acquire land required for the expansion of towns and 
cities and to pay inflated prices for it”.  The report recommended that owners should 
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be paid the current agricultural market value plus 25 per cent for their land, and 
detailed how this situation was compatible with Irish law.  The policy was almost 
unanimously in the public interest, and in fact “threatened just one small group of 
people – the speculators and developers who controlled the large land banks”.  
However, since its publication successive governments have agreed in principle with 
the recommendations of the report, but nevertheless consistently avoided 
implementing them.  Thus the state effectively encouraged the inflation of land values 
(O’ Toole 2009, pp. 106-109).  Similarly, the range of tax breaks available since the 
early 1980s have enormously benefited developers to the detriment of the public 
purse, and public-private partnerships with highly favourable, low risk returns to 
developers have been used to implement crucial infrastructural works.  Even recent 
initiatives, such as the Social Housing Leasing Initiative to deal with the public 
housing waiting list, are structured to favour the developer over the long term (in this 
case, private housing would be rented for 20 years then returned to the developer, 
rather than the state purchasing the property over the same period and then absorbing 
it into the social housing stock or selling it on for a profit to the taxpayer).  It is 
perhaps unsurprising then that during the Celtic Tiger boom the property developer 
became a central figure in Irish political life.   
 
Fifth, the government’s pro-cyclical fiscal policy and taxation system worked to both 
boost the construction industry and to make it critical to sustaining public spending, 
rather than acting as a counterweight to ensure sustainable growth.  As noted, there 
were a range of a different taxation incentive schemes to aid development.  Moreover, 
stamp duty, capital gains taxes and VAT were significant contributors to the public 
purse.  Davy Research (2006) reported that the property market accounted for 17% of 
total tax revenue in 2006, up from 5% in 1998 (see Figure 19; datasheet 19).  
Revenues from stamp duty on property transactions were c. €2.98b in 2006, up from 
387m in 1998, and there were c. €3.2b in VAT receipts (CSO 2008, Davy Research 
2006; datasheet 20).  Stamp duty was lowered several times between 2001 and 2007, 
and the ceiling on income tax deductibility of mortgage interest for owner occupiers 
was increased four times between 2000 and 2008, in order to further stimulate the 
housing market (Honohan 2010).  In addition, a significant number of people were 
employed in the construction and related sectors and construction was accounting for 
a significant chunk of growth in GDP.  By Quarter 2, 2007, 13.4% of all workers were 
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employed in the construction industry in Ireland, the highest rate in Europe, with the 
EU average being 8.2% (CSO 2008; datasheet 21).  A large number of other people 
were employed in related material, service and consumer industries, supplying the 
construction industry and new and existing home owners.  Between 2003 and 2006 
the value of construction output grew from €23,811m to €37,401m, with building and 
construction estimated to have accounted for 9% of GDP and 10.4% of GNP in 2006 
(DKM 2008, cited in CSO 2008; datasheet 22).   
 
Figure 19: Property-related tax revenue 
 
Source: Davy Research (2006); PTR = property tax revenue; TTR = total tax revenue 
 
Sixth, the domestic banking sector got involved in a lending war driven by personal 
bonus schemes and inter-bank rivalry to generate record annual profits, flooding the 
market with development and mortgage capital that catered to speculator and buyer 
demand, but also actively encouraged it.  Rather than using their own deposits to 
underpin loans, given favourable lending rates, banks borrowed money from other 
international banks and private equity funds to offer evermore easier forms of credit to 
home buyers (such as 100% mortgages over longer time spans) and investors (such as 
deferred interest payments).  Utilising the international financial markets for credit 
“greatly increased banks’ vulnerability to changing market sentiment” (Honohan 
2010: 6).  This reckless lending, often conducted without proper due process and 
exceeding stress test criteria, was exacerbated by financial deregulation and a 
regulatory system that failed to adequately police the banking sector (Ross 2009; 
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Murphy and Devlin 2009).  The Honohan Report (2010) makes it clear that there were 
catastrophic regulatory and governance failures both in the financial sector itself (with 
respect to senior management decisions, bank auditors and accountants, and financial 
intermediaries such as mortgage brokers) and the Central Bank and Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland which overemphasised process rather than outcomes, 
downplayed quantification of risks, applied ‘light-touch’ and deferential regulation, 
and failed to implement any penalties for breaches of rules and regulations.  
Moreover, they created a false sense of security by producing reports that were overly 
optimistic and reassuring, regardless of the evidence base.  This was compounded by 
similar reports from the IMF, OECD and other bodies such as rating agencies and 
vested interest groups.  Managing the economy was also hampered by the fact that the 
Irish Central Bank could not directly influence consumer spending as it did not have 
control of interest rates (which resided with the European Central Bank).  As the 
Honohan Report (2010) notes, Ireland’s banking performance was the second poorest 
after Iceland during the present global downturn, and was entirely homemade on the 
basis of the Irish construction boom, rather than exposure to sub-prime mortgages or 
aggressive overseas acquisitions. 
 
Seventh, self-interest played a significant role, with little coordinated campaigning for 
housing policy changes beyond debates concerning stamp duty (with the pressure to 
reduce or abolish the duty, which would have added fuel to the fire).  As noted, 
central and local government were benefiting through direct and indirect tax; a 
household’s primary asset was gaining value; a relatively large group of buy-to-let 
and flipping investors were gaining profits through rising property values; and those 
working in the construction and consumption sectors were benefiting through good 
jobs with decent incomes.  It seemed to be in very few people’s interest to put the 
brakes on the housing boom, and the prevailing logic was that the market would slow 
to a ‘soft landing’ rather than crash (see Dept of Finance 2006, Central Bank 2006). 
 
The result of these various factors, underpinned by a neoliberal philosophy of free 
market development and market-led regulation, was a housing bubble created as a 
function of housing development being driven largely by developers, rather than 
having adequate state oversight, regulation and coordination with respect to finance 
and planning, and a housing market driven by consumer panic of being unable to 
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climb on the property ladder and speculators.  In turn, housing development became 
increasingly decoupled from any sort of realistic economic or demographic 
projections.  This was the outcome of the interrelationship of close institutional 
arrangements between policy-makers and the property sector, and the diffusion of 
pro-growth discourses relating to housing development, investment and speculation 
across all levels of Irish society.   
 
The extent to which this arrangement was normalised was extraordinary.  Anybody 
who questioned what was happening and predicted impending disaster was vilified 
and ridiculed in the media by commercial economists and government politicians.  
Probably the most high profile example relates to Morgan Kelly, Professor of 
Economics at UCD, who argued that a collapse in the wider economy and the 
property sector was immanent (M. Kelly 2007), and who’s reputation was roundly 
attacked in the media, with Bertie Ahern (the Taoiseach at the time) going so far as to 
state that the he didn’t understand why the naysayers didn’t ‘commit suicide’ 
(Finfacts 2007).  Even now, the TINA (There Is No Alternative) mantra is maintained, 
and anyone who questions government policies is accused of seeking to undermine 
any recovery, rather than offering constructive criticism that might lead to better 
outcomes.  This strategy seeks to stifle criticism and try to reassure the public, and is 
clearly designed to serve the interests of the state and the financial sector, often at the 
expense of the taxpayer.    
 
 
7. The Government’s Solution to the Banking and Property Crisis: NAMA 
The government’s response to the banking and property crisis in Ireland has been 
characteristic of the short-termist and reactionary modus operandi of Irish politics that 
then unfolds into a de facto longer term response, and seeks to protect as much as 
possible the interests of the developer and financial class (O’Toole 2009; Ross 2009).  
The government’s initial reaction to the faltering economy was to insist that the banks 
were well capitalised and that the housing market would slow to ‘soft landing’.  
However, as the crisis deepened and liquidity started to try up on the international 
money markets, it started to become clear that there were significant problems of 
capitalisation in the Irish banking sector.  Banks neither had the funds to lend to 
investors and businesses, nor to pay back loans to international banks.  Irish bank 
 45
share prices collapsed (between May 2007 and November 2008 Irish shares fell in 
value from €55b to €4b) resulting in the introduction of a state backed bank guarantee 
scheme to prevent a run on the banks, wherein the state underwrote €440b of deposits 
and other assets (Murphy and Devlin 2009).  Property buyers and investors, already 
cautious because of the slow down in the housing market, found it increasingly 
difficult to source credit, thus developers found themselves left with liquidity 
problems that prevented them from finishing out developments.  In order to introduce 
liquidity into the Irish banking system the state took a two-pronged approach: (1) 
direct recapitalisation or nationalisation, wherein the state took a stake in the banks 
for preferential shares or took direct ownership, using the national pension reserve and 
finance procured on the international markets; (2) relieving the banks of their toxic 
assets by purchasing all property loans of €5m or more issued before December 1st 
2008 and placing them in a new state agency to manage on behalf of the taxpayer.  
Somewhat controversially, all Irish banks were to participate in the strategy adopted, 
meaning that the two institutions with the smallest depositor base and largest portfolio 
of toxic debt (Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide) were protected from being 
wound down. 
 
The new property agency to manage the second scheme is the National Assets 
Management Agency (NAMA), part of the National Treasury Management Agency 
(NTMA).  Plans for NAMA were announced in the Minister for Finance’s 
Supplementary Budget on 7th April 2009, with the National Asset Management 
Agency Bill (2009) published September 10th of that year.  The Bill enables NAMA 
to acquire bank assets relating to land and development loans and associated loans, 
and to manage those assets for the benefit of the taxpayer.  It has been endowed with 
“all the necessary commercial powers of a financial asset management company to 
establish subsidiaries, to operate through agents, to buy and sell assets, to manage 
loans and work with borrowers, to borrow, to lend, to provide guarantees and to take 
whatever action it considers appropriate in relation to the debts owing and the 
underlying security” (NAMA 2009: 6).  The first loans were transferred from the 
banks to NAMA in March 29th 2010 (NAMA 2010a).   
 
The NAMA Draft Business Plan (2009) details that in total, €88bn worth of assets 
with a loan book of  €77bn and €9bn in rolled up interest, are being transferred to 
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NAMA from five Irish banks (AIB - €24.1bn, Bank of Ireland - €15.5bn, EBS - 
€0.8bn, Irish Nationwide - €8.3bn, and Anglo Irish Bank - €28.4bn): €27.8bn (36%) 
relates to ‘land’, €21.8bn (28%) relates to ‘development loans’, €27.7bn (36%) relates 
to ‘associated loans’.  In return for the impaired assets, the agency issues the five 
banks with government-backed bonds, which the banks can use to borrow from the 
European Central Bank, and thus, in theory at least, inject liquidity into the Irish 
banking system.  Rather than paying present market value of the underlying assets, 
NAMA is paying 15% more to represent long term economic value.  Based on the 
first payments to banks, the state is paying on average 50% of the loan value for the 
asset (NAMA 2010b), though the developer will continue to repay the full value of 
the loan.  NAMA estimates that 40% of the loans will be cashflow generating and that 
80% of loans will be repaid by borrowers, with 20% defaulting.  NAMA has up to 
€5bn to selectively spend on completing projects.   
 
The NAMA portfolio involves loans relating to c.1,600 borrowers, with c.100 
borrowers accounting for 50% of the portfolio.  All borrowers are compelled to 
produce full business plans as to how they aim to repay their loans.  Because, under 
the EU stability and growth pact, countries are obliged to have a debt/GDP ratio of 
60% or less, to keep the government-back bonds from appearing on the state’s 
accounts, NAMA is to be subsumed into a Eurostat-approved special purposes vehicle 
(SPV - National Asset Management Agency Investment Ltd) which is a majority 
privately owned entity with decision making autonomy.  Private investors will 
provide 51% of the equity (the SPV will raise €100 million in capital), with the 
government holding 49% (as of March 2010, the three main investors are Irish Life 
Assurance, New Ireland (a subsidiary of Bank of Ireland), and major pension and 
institutional clients of AIB Investment Managers (AIBIM) (NAMA 2010a)).  Over 
the proposed ten year life span of NAMA, the agency predicted that its asset 
management will yield €4.8 billion in profit to the Irish state (NAMA 2009) (although 
this was revised downwards in July 2010 – see Oliver 2010). 
 
At present, there is very little detail available with respect to the loans being 
transferred into NAMA and the properties they relate to (for example, whether they 
are residential, office, retail, industrial, leisure, etc; types of land; whether land is 
zoned or has planning permission; whether developments are complete or under-
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construction), nor the specific geography beyond national territories (see Table 4).  As 
a consequence, it is difficult to determine the present status of assets and their future 
potential worth.  Land in areas of high surplus housing and/or over-zoning is likely to 
fall greatly in value and to stay that way for quite some time, limiting the ability of 
NAMA to realize any profit, especially if it is acquired for too high a value.  As 
Sinead Kelly (2009) has argued, the geography of NAMA assets is critical for its 
likely future success.  She goes onto to note that in an industry that has long lived by 
the mantra ‘location, location and location’, the wilful neglect of spatial 
considerations in the Irish case is striking, stating: 
 
“The very viability of NAMA as a financial project is highly dependent on the 
geography of those property assets which underpin the loans which NAMA is 
purchasing. While certain well-located assets may indeed provide for a secure 
yield in the medium term, others, such as large sites lacking any urban zoning 
status located at the edge of small Irish towns and villages for which enormous 
prices were paid per hectare, are unlikely even in the very long term to prove 
to possess much value above that of farmland.” 
 
It is difficult to disagree with her assessment.  What is particularly worrying in the 
Irish case is the sheer volume of impaired assets – both excess housing and land – in 
locations that will be the slowest to recover in any economic upswing. 
Table 4: Geographical breakdown of NAMA portfolio 
 L&D loans Associated 
loans 
Total % of total 
Ireland 33.13 18.35 51.48 66.80% 
Northern Ireland 3.29 1.51 4.8 6.20% 
Great Britain 10.34 5.59 15.93 20.70% 
USA 1.39 0.66 2.05 2.70% 
Germany 0.05 1.01 1.06 1.40% 
Portugal 0.46 0.14 0.6 0.70% 
France 0.39 0.13 0.52 0.70% 
Czech Republic 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.20% 
Italy 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.20% 
Spain 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.20% 
Other 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.30% 
TOTAL (€ billions) 49.38 27.73 77.11 100.00% 
 
Source: NAMA (2009) 
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NAMA, in conjunction with the developer, has six options as to the strategy it will 
pursue with respect to managing assets (Carswell 2010).  First, the properties can be 
sold at a rate far below the original valuation, but which covers the loan transfer cost.  
Second, the properties can be leased.  With respect to housing, properties could be 
rented to either private sector or public sector tenants.  In terms of social housing, in 
2009 the DEHLG implemented the Social Housing Leasing Initiative that enables: the 
long-term leasing of privately owned properties by local authorities; leasing 
arrangements for Approved Housing Bodies (voluntary and cooperative sector); and 
temporary use of unsold affordable homes.  Third, properties can be held for a few 
years in anticipation of the market rising before sale.  Fourth, under-construction 
properties can be developed with a view to selling the properties when the market 
rises.  Fifth, properties can be managed as on-going concerns.  Sixth, properties that 
have little chance of ever being completed or sold can be demolished.  Which 
particular tactics are deployed will depend on the local and specific factors associated 
with asset such as location and potential demand, occupancy rate, the percentage still 
under-construction, local clientist politics, state policy, and the interventions of local 
authorities, state agencies, housing associations, etc.  
 
In the case of ghost estates, each of these options has different consequences for 
existing residents.  If properties are off-loaded through a firesale then the negative 
equity of existing residents will be exacerbated vis-à-vis their new neighbours.  While 
all housing developments should be socially mixed, it is likely that there will be some 
resistance by existing residents to such an outcome due to NIMBY and negative 
equity issues.  In addition, there are questions as to the suitability of some properties 
for social housing due to location and access to employment, public transport, 
services and community facilities, and the design, size and specification of properties.  
Holding properties will mean that residents will continue to live without neighbours 
and/or on a building site for some time.  With respect to managing estates, empty or 
under-construction properties will need to be maintained to stop entropy setting in and 
the stock deteriorating, and in those estates with low occupancy that are overseen by a 
management agency the fees are likely to be too low to adequate maintain and service 
the estate.  Demolishing will be highly disruptive and it will be costly to return land to 
its former state. 
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Since its announcement, the NAMA project has been roundly criticized by opposition 
politicians and economists (see for example, Gurdgiev 2010, Lyons 2010, Lucey 
2010, McWilliams 2010a, b, c, Whelan 2010b).  There is a broad concern as to 
whether NAMA is the right vehicle to deal with the property crisis and whether it can 
succeed given the make-up of the portfolio (particularly given the geography of assets 
and the amount of land and redundant property such as ‘zombie hotels’), the extent of 
the property crash, the sums being paid by the state to the banks for their ‘assets’, the 
validity of ascribed long-term economic values and rent yields, and the veracity of 
underlying economic models and calculations.  It is also not clear as to how valuations 
are being made and whether they take into account existing levels of oversupply and 
evidence-informed, long-term projections of an area’s demography and labour market.  
Others question the fact that NAMA is paying a notional long term economic value 
rate rather than present market prices, thus second guessing the market and inflating 
the transfer to the banks at the state’s risk; and that to recover the state investment the 
property market will need to be re-inflated, which will mean the re-inflation of the 
surrounding apparatus of interests in banking, property, planning, and government.    
Moreover, if land is purchased by the state on the basis of existing zoning then any 
future dezoning by local authorities will deflate its value and lead to a loss on the 
investment.   
 
For those on the Right, NAMA represents state interference in the logic of the free 
market, disrupting its ‘natural’ recovery by artificially controlling large elements of 
the property market and protecting failed developers and speculators in the short term 
who otherwise would have gone bust, thus blocking the growth of more resilient 
players or new start-ups.  For those on the Left it protects those who created the crisis 
but it does nothing to protect home owners and tenants struggling to pay mortgages 
and rent and who are also underwriting NAMA’s costs.  Moreover, it is employing as 
experts (bankers, estate agents, property consultants, planners, lawyers) the very same 
people who acted irresponsibly to create the bubble, some of whom are overseeing 
transfers from their former employers.  These experts are being handsomely rewarded 
for their services, with fees expecting to run to €2.46bn over the life course of the 
agency (NAMA 2009).  Further, NAMA is exempt from freedom of information 
requests and despite managing a vast amount of state managed assets it is particularly 
 50
opaque in its operation.  Most damaging, NAMA has so far failed to deliver on a 
primary aim, to create liquidity in the Irish banking sector, which has subsequently 
needed significant further recapitalisation. 
 
As Declan Curran (2010) has noted with reference to international evidence collated 
by the World Bank (Klingebiel  2000) and Financial Stability Institute (Fung et al, 
2004), NAMA-style agencies that are either charged with disposing rapidly (Mexico, 
Spain, USA, China, Korea, Malaysia) or managing impaired assets (Finland, Sweden, 
Japan) need a confluence of benign conditions to succeed.  In both cases, the crucial 
factor is a strong recovery in the wider economy and property market, with other 
favourable factors including: 
 Appropriate funding and appropriate powers (e.g., the ability to change 
management immediately, purchase assets, offer guarantees or counter- 
guarantees on behalf of restructured banks, grant long-term loans at subsidized 
rates or permit temporary regulatory forebearance) for resolving agency 
 Banks to be resolved were small banks which made it ‘politically easier’ to 
resolve 
 The largest banks were sound enough to assist in resolving the smaller banks, 
albeit under significant state pressure 
 Non-performing assets were a small percentage of the entire banking systems 
assets 
 Deep and sophisticated capital markets 
 Adequate governance structures; professional management and extensive use 
of private sector contractors for asset disposal. 
The difficulty for NAMA, as he sees it, is that in the Irish case, these conditions are 
either not present or unlikely to emerge in the short term.  Perhaps, more worryingly, 
the factors that were deemed to negatively affect the performance of these agencies 
are present to varying extents: 
 Lacklustre demand for real estate assets 
 Poor quality of underlying assets 
 Lack of funding for the agency 
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 Inconsistent objectives for the agency: cost minimisation and rapid disposal of 
assets, on one hand, and an objective to structure and time asset sales to 
minimise negative impact on the real estate market 
 Assets transferred include politically connected loans which can be difficult 
for a government agency to handle 
 Disparate set of assets due to unclear eligibility criteria 
 Weak legal framework (e.g. the debtor had to agree to the sale of the assets) 
 Controversy over incentive-based payment schemes for employees 
 Deficient framework for foreclosures and seizure of assets. 
Interestingly, very few of the critiques of NAMA question the underlying neoliberal 
ideology that underpins the creation and operation of the agency and the whole Irish 
economic model.  Indeed, there seems to be widespread acceptance that the core 
logics and principles underpinning Ireland’s economy during the Celtic Tiger period 
were fundamentally sound, and that the crisis and crash were simply the result of 
misfortune with respect to the timing of the global financial crisis, poor management 
and regulation, and cronyism and greed (in other words, how it was (mis)applied).  In 
general then, criticisms do not extend to the Irish economic model, with its narrow tax 
base of low corporate and income tax, high indirect taxes, and lack of property taxes, 
and its laissez fair approach to planning and regulation.  As critical urban theorist, 
Peter Marcuse (2009) has noted, “todays-more-than-financial-crisis” is being 
rationalised away as an anomaly within the system of neoliberal capitalism, a cog to 
be corrected rather than indicative of more systemic failures. 
 
“The financial crisis seems to be spreading, to engulf more and more people, 
to cause more and more unemployment, insecurity, hunger and want, a greater 
and greater dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, with inequality, luxury 
in the midst of poverty … [I]t is not the financial crisis spreading to other parts 
of the economy that we confront, but an economy whose contradictions are 
erupting in a very visible manner in the financial sector, but only as 
manifestations of much more deep-seated contradictions which we should not 
allow to be concealed in the focus on issues of regulation or deregulation in 
one small excrescence of a fundamentally flawed system as a whole.” 
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Marcuse argues that states have been very effective in erecting a wall against any 
fundamental questioning of the system of neoliberal governance.  Ireland is no 
exception.   It seems that Ireland’s economic model is beyond question and the debate 
about the Irish economy concerns how to get that same model back on track.  The 
solutions to the crisis then are a selection of alternative tactics wherein the overall 
strategy is a new round of neoliberalisation.  In other words, rather than seeking 
radical change with respect to the economic, political and planning systems, a fresh 
dose of neoliberalisation is seen as the solution to the failings of previous rounds of 
neoliberalism.  The apparatus that created the conditions for crisis are not only left in 
place, their positions are strengthened through affirmation.   
 
There are a number of reasons to be worried by this strategy.  As presently 
formulated, the Irish economic model is dependent on high growth and consumption 
to function optimally given it is underpinned by low direct and high indirect taxes.  If 
growth stops and/or consumption decreases then a significant hole is created in the 
national tax base and national borrowing has to fill the gap.  As well as a banking and 
property crisis, Ireland is presently experiencing a severe taxation crisis – a sizable 
element of the public purse was being funded by cyclically sensitive taxes such as 
stamp duty, VAT and capital gains tax that have largely evaporated.  It is for this 
reason that the model has proven to be unsustainable.  Even without the global 
downturn, given that the model is predicated on constant, sustained growth and a 
shallow tax base it was always going to run into difficulties at some point given the 
ebb and flow of economies (a point also noted in the Honohan Report 2010).  Endless 
rounds of public service cutbacks may achieve some efficiencies in the system, but 
also a highly anaemic public sector, with weak provision of services such as education 
and health, and a continued dearth of key transport, energy and public infrastructure.  
It also further undermines the tax base and, as others have demonstrated, drastically 
cutting public spending has not only failed to reduce the fiscal deficit, but rather has 
increased it further (Burke 2010; Pentony 2010) 
 
NAMA is indicative of the government’s acceptance of a ‘commonsense’ 
neoliberalism (the perceived importance of banks regaining solvency and remaining 
independent from state control) and clientalism (NAMA works to bail out a set of 
elites that drove the boom into a recessionary brick wall).  In this sense, it is the 
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logical illogical response to the crisis within the context of the fractured ideologies of 
the Irish political system.  As such, its logic is skewed.  In order to remedy a crisis 
brought about by an unsustainable property bubble, NAMA’s stated aim is to re-
inflate this bubble by stabilising those sectors primarily responsible at the expense of 
the taxpayer. 
 
Without substantive changes with respect to its economic, political and planning 
systems, Ireland will continue to be vulnerable to the boom and bust cycles that have 
left the country littered with excess housing and over-zoned land worth a fraction of 
its value at the height of the boom.  Whilst NAMA does offer one solution to the 
problem, it is also a risky strategy that could cost the taxpayer dearly for several 
generations.  More worryingly, NAMA does not address some of the fundamental 
problems of the Irish situation that will shape development into the long term – the 
cabal between politicians, developers and banks; a planning system in which local 
councillors representing vested interests can play a significant role, and has too few 
checks and balances to stop excessive zonings and permissions; crony capitalism at all 
scales of governance; zero-sum and local pro-growth development strategies that lack 
overall vision and coordination at regional and national levels; and poor housing data 
from which to develop evidence-informed policy analysis.  It is true that the National 
Spatial Strategy and the new Planning and Development (Amendment) Bill do 
provide the potential to address some of these issues, but so far the National Spatial 
Strategy has been largely ignored by government policy and its programmes were 
amongst the first axed in public sector cuts, and in anticipation of the Planning and 
Development (Amendment) Bill local authorities have been seeking ways to 
circumvent its provisions by zoning tracts of land before its passage through the Dail, 
suggesting that it will be roundly resisted when implemented. 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
The growth in the Irish housing market, both in terms of revenue and land-use, has 
had an era-defining impact on Irish society.  It has affected everything from the social 
and demographic profile of cities, towns and villages, trends in employment and 
commuting patterns, and political decision-making, to the level of people’s personal 
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aspirations.  In this paper, we have documented the Irish housing landscape in the 
post-Celtic Tiger period, arguing that the housing bubble and subsequent crash in the 
banking and property sectors was not simply a result of the global financial crash and 
a lack of financial regulation.  It was largely a home grown crisis.   
 
As well as a catastrophic failure in Ireland’s banking and financial regulatory system, 
there has been a catastrophic failure of the planning system at all scales.  Planning 
should have acted as the counter-balance to the excessive pressures for development, 
working for the common good to produce sustainable patterns of residential and 
commercial property.  Instead, both fiscal and planning policy formation, 
implementation and regulation were overtly shaped by the neoliberal policies adopted 
by the state, particularly in the period from 1997 onwards.  During this time, the 
government pursued a neoliberal agenda of promoting the free market, minimising 
regulation, privatising public goods, and keeping direct taxes low and indirect taxes 
high, framed within a political system in which localism, clientalism, and cronyism 
existed to varying extents across the modes and scales of governance.  The state thus 
loosened regulation of the financial sector, introduced tax incentive schemes, changed 
the parameters of stamp duty, lowered capital gains tax, allowed developers to forego 
their affordable and social housing obligations, promoted a laissez faire planning 
system, and failed to address the vestiges of clientelism.  In short, it allowed the 
property sector to be driven by developers, speculators and banks, rewarding them 
with tax incentives, less tax obligations, and market-led regulation; it enabled buyers 
to over-extend their indebtedness; and it provided too few barriers to development.   
 
Whilst the global financial crisis might have been a contributing factor, the Irish 
housing market was already running out of control, with supply outstripping potential 
demand in all parts of the country, and house and land prices skyrocketing to amongst 
the most expensive in the world.  And banks had massively over-extended themselves 
lending to developers.  The crash was inevitable.  The severity of the crash was 
significantly exacerbated by the state’s neoliberal agenda and lack of oversight, 
foresight and poor policy formation with respect to both the planning system and 
banking sectors.  Worryingly, the present government’s solution to the crisis has been 
another round of short-termist neoliberalism in the form of the public collectivization 
of private debt through detoxification, recapitalisation, and nationalisation of the 
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banks and the protection of the interests of developers and speculators at the potential 
expense of the taxpayer.   
 
Even if one does not agree with our interpretation of the reasons for the property crisis 
or our analysis of the proposed solution through NAMA, the fact remains that Ireland 
has a significant oversupply of housing and zoned land, its house prices have 
plummeted, its property-related tax intake has contracted sharply, and the country is 
littered with ghost estates and vacant property.  In that sense, the data we have 
presented largely speak for themselves.  During the Celtic Tiger period, housing 
supply and demand became disconnected.  The de-coupling of housing development 
from any sort of realistic demographic projections, along with cheap credit, 
speculative over-lending, tax incentive schemes and a planning system that actively 
encouraged over-development, has left a staggering level of oversupply in the housing 
market, which has produced both an immediate policy dilemma and a series of long-
term issues that are only beginning to come into focus.  This issue of oversupply is not 
limited to housing, but also hotels (see Bacon 2009 and O’Brien 2010), offices (see S. 
Kelly 2009), shopping centres, retail parks and industrial units.  Ireland is awash with 
buildings that few people either can afford or want to purchase. 
 
Our analysis highlights that the issues of oversupply varies substantially across the 
country, with the highest levels prevalent where rural and urban tax incentive schemes 
were in operation.  It could well be over a decade or more in some locations before 
excess housing stock becomes occupied, depending on an economic recovery, 
liquidity amongst lenders, and demographic demand.  Our model projects demand 
based on 1996-2006 household formation, a time of unprecedented growth, along with 
holiday home demand.  It is, therefore, somewhat of a best case scenario given that 
household growth has slowed given out-migration and the decline in holiday home 
sales.  In the past, recession has led to sizable rural out-migration, and if this occurs 
again in the present period, then the oversupply issue will deepen in many rural areas.  
Oversupply might last less time in urban areas, particularly in the commuter belt 
around Dublin, although this might be extended depending on the amount of vacant 
investor property that is eased onto the market.  Given the extent of the oversupply, 
and the fact that much of it is not necessarily optimally located for future projected 
demand, house prices are likely to remain depressed for some time.  Indeed, most 
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economic commentators are now predicting that house prices will continue to fall, 
with most suggesting that prices will drop on average by 40-60% from their peak (M. 
Kelly 2007; Finfacts 2009; Whelan 2010a). 
 
This is not to say that this is no requirement for construction in the state in the short 
term.  Rather, that there is little need for housing beyond social housing provision.  
Where construction could be fruitfully undertaken would be with respect to public 
facilities such as schools and hospitals, public transport, roads, energy and broadband 
infrastructure.  Such a targeted capital investment will on the one hand stimulate the 
economy in terms of employment and investment and provide multiplier effects 
across the private sector, and on the other provide worldclass infrastructure to 
facilitate and encourage indigenous growth and inward investment. 
 
At present, there are seven key issues that will need to be addressed before consumers 
regain confidence and prices bottom out and start to rise again.  First, supply and 
demand will need to be harmonized.  On the one hand this necessitates a dramatic 
reduction in the number of new homes built and the dezoning of land, on the other the 
number of households will have to increase.  Second, there has to be a sustained 
growth in the economy with an associated fall in unemployment.  Third, house prices 
have to align more closely to average industrial earnings.  Fourth, affordable credit 
has to be available for first time buyers and those trading up.  Fifth, the uncertainties 
concerning NAMA and its operation have to dispelled, especially since it will be 
controlling a sizable share of properties and land.  This necessitates full transparency 
of the agency’s workings and the assets it is managing.  Sixth, consumers have to be 
satisfied that the banking crisis is truly over and that financial institutions are properly 
regulated.   
 
Seventh, substantive changes in the planning system will also aid the process of 
recovery.  To date, there has been a great deal of attention directed at banks, but very 
little to the agencies that zoned land, gave planning permissions and coordinated and 
promoted development.  Multi-scalar, long term, comprehensive planning strategies, 
underpinned by robust evidence, and linked to coherent social, economic and 
environmental policies, need to be implemented that are resistant to the vagaries of 
local clientelism (to a certain extent the new Planning and Development 
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(Amendment) Bill will address some of these issues).  As part of the revisioning of 
planning, houses and settlements need to viewed as homes and communities, not 
simply assets and opportunities (Sparks and Duke 2010).  Further, there is a need for 
much better, timely, and harmonized housing data.  There is no national register of 
property or property sales, meaning the surrogates such as ESB or mortgage data has 
to be used.  What limited data there are available are released at a coarse spatial 
resolution, making the tracking or modelling of local housing markets impossible.  
Data can also have significant time-lags (e.g., vacancy is only measured once every 5 
years), and different local authorities record data differently (e.g. building starts) 
making comparisons difficult. 
 
In our view, the solution to the property crisis needs to be more than another round of 
neoliberalisation and striving to revive the same economic model that left Ireland 
vulnerable to any economic slowdown.  Rather, it is to revisit the Celtic Tiger 
economic model and to make fundamental changes that will help make it more robust 
and sustainable.  At the heart of this process needs to be a restructuring and widening 
of the tax system to provide a more stable base of progressive taxes with less reliance 
on indirect, cyclical taxes, and rigorous, systematic oversight to ensure proper checks 
and balances in the system.  There are many forms of political economy in operation 
globally, with dozens of varieties of capitalism and liberalism (Hall and Soskice 
2001), and there is nothing inevitable or sacred about the political economic model 
that has operated in Ireland over the past twenty years.  Indeed, there are many lessons 
to be learnt from abroad and from the Irish experience.   
 
It is our contention that an independent review of the operation of the planning system 
during the Celtic Tiger years be undertaken to consider fully the role of planning in 
the creation of the property bubble, similar to the Honohan (2010) and the Regling 
and Watson (2010) reports on the banking and financial regulation.  The review 
would examine all aspects of the planning system, including planning policy 
formation and application, and the organisation, operation and regulation of planning 
within and across different agencies and at all scales in Ireland.  The kinds of 
questions such a review might examine include: Why was planning not working to 
counter-balance the excesses of development?  Did the planning system work 
effectively for the common good?  Was there sufficiently joined-up thinking and 
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coordination between all the various agencies responsible for housing, planning and 
development?  Was there appropriate regard paid to inter-jurisdictional alignment of 
plans?  Did the processes and procedures of regulation, compliance and enforcement 
work as efficiently and effectively as they should have?  Was development and 
planning too developer-led and not sufficiently community and plan-led?  To what 
extent has clientelism, cronyism and localism been at work, undermining due process 
and adversely shaping the planning system?  To what extent did policies such as 
decentralisation and tax incentive schemes undermine other policy instruments such 
as the National Spatial Strategy?  Did plans and schemes have sufficient oversight 
with appropriate monitoring instruments that could track progress and levers to 
control roll-out?  Has planning been sufficiently evidence-informed, underpinned by 
high-quality data that is timely and available at suitable scales?  These kinds of 
questions need to be thoroughly examined.  An inquiry should not, however, take the 
form of a witch hunt or a blame game, but rather constitute a systemic review of how 
the planning system failed to counter and control the excesses of the boom and 
provide a more stable and sustainable pattern of development.   
 
It would be foolhardy to address issues in the banking sector without also reviewing 
and taking corrective action in the planning sphere.  To not do so would be to invite a 
future in which past mistakes are endlessly repeated.   
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